Before the Olympic Winter Games in Sochi in 2014 there was an intense international discussion on the wanting Russian record on democracy and human rights and the appropriateness of organizing such mega-events in authoritarian settings. These kinds of discussions had a familiar ring to them; similar voices were heard before the Beijing Summer Olympics in 2008. However, what was notable in the scholarly discussion after the Beijing Olympics was a lack of substantiated follow-up with regard to political and social consequences of the Games. Once the Olympic Games were launched, the sports events themselves took over the public limelight. Further to this, media logics seem to dictate that once any Games are over, critical discussions are over and done with, and the attention is gradually shifted to the next mega-event to follow, in the Sochi case the Summer Games in Rio in 2016 and the FIFA World Cup in football which will be arranged in several locations in Russia in 2018. In the case of the Sochi Games, the fading from attention was exacerbated by the dramatic events which unfolded around Ukraine and the Russian role in them which came to dominate newscasts from a time when the Games had barely even been concluded.
often discussed as particularly acute problems in relation to the Olympics. The first one of these is related to infrastructural investments in the area and the risk of them being turned into so-called white elephants, costing a lot of money and being of no actual use, neither by the local population nor by tourists to the region. The second theme regards the feared environmental degradation due to the organization of the mega-event and the extent to which the prognosticated problems have come to materialize. These two are matters that in one shape or another seem to be brought up in relation to all Olympics in contemporary times, possibly with the exception of the Lillehammer Olympics of 1994 which were generally praised for its modesty, small-scale format and back-to-the roots quality (Taras 2013 ). The third theme, which enjoyed substantial attention before the Olympics, is however specially related to the Sochi Olympics. It deals with the indigenous Circassian population and the extent to which its members were maltreated, marginalized and squeezed out from the geographical area which constitutes their homeland. Despite their seeming disparity, the basic reason for bringing up the three subjects in the chapter is the same: to argue the need for continued attention to perceived trouble-spots even after the close of the Games.
The chapter follows up on an inventory, edited by the authors in the year before the Olympics, of perceived potential problems related to the Sochi Winter Games. That particular inventory took stock of what the authors of this piece chose to call the Sochi predicament (Petersson and Vamling 2013) . The point that the authors would like to make is thus that this predicament still exists. The problems remain even though the world's attention has faded. In some respects the problems may have gotten more acute and it is vital not to leave the local population in the lurch.
Infrastructure and white elephants
During the run-up to the Olympics it was noted on several occasions on the highest political levels in Russia that infrastructural development in the region as a whole was a prominent governmental objective. Another aim was to successfully establish Sochi as a winter holiday resort for Russian as well as foreign tourists . In the discussion in the media about effects in Sochi and North Caucasus following Sochi-2014 some observers have indeed, on the side of benefits, noted modernizing effects such as higher standards of service and more well-organized reception of tourists and other visitors, and a markedly enhanced availability of cafés and sites of accommodation. All this, it has been argued, makes Sochi a destination that can compete with European resorts as far as facilities are concerned (Kuzmina 2014 , Grebennikova 2014 . Moreover, the Games have resulted in a huge capacity of luxury accommodation, both in the Olympic village and the city of Sochi but also in the mountains in Krasnaya Polyana.
On the face of it, the Olympics have indeed meant a general improvement of infrastructure in the Sochi region, both with regard to main roads, railroads, air traffic and marine transportation (Working meeting with Transport Minister Maxim Sokolov, 2014). In connection with the Olympic Winter Games, a sports university, the Russian International Olympic University, opened in Sochi. Fittingly, it was profiled towards management of sport mega-events, and it was funded by the Russian tycoon Vladimir Potanin's company Interros, which also owns the Roza Khutor complex in Krasnaya Polyana (Saakov 2014) .
During the construction phase many commentators expressed doubts whether all arenas, hotels and other sites would be ready in time for the Games. As a matter of fact, they were.
The demand for construction workers was huge during the run-up and attracted large numbers of migrant workers. According to Human Rights Watch (2013) over 16,000 workers from outside of Russia, mainly from Central Asia, worked on the different Olympic objects.
Construction workers interviewed by a local NGO made serious complaints such as that "employers cheated workers out of wages, required them to work 12-hour shifts with few days off, and confiscated passports and work permits, apparently to coerce workers to remain in exploitative jobs" (Human Rights Watch 2013). One year after the end of the Games the issue of wage arrears to (now departed) migrant construction workers is still on the agenda.
Human rights activists estimate salary debts that have not been paid to Sochi constructions workers to more than 30 million roubles (Krasov 2014) . The migrant workers still try to act on their complaints, and appeals have been made to the Russian State Duma in the matter (Kavkazskii Uzel 2015).
In the post-Olympics phase Sochi faces the same problem as most, if not all, other Olympic sites: to find an effective and alternative use of the infrastructure that was created during a highly compressed period to meet a frantic demand which peaked during a very limited time.
In this process the familiar problem of trying to avoid the emergence of white elephants is prone to appear. In the annual Direct Line broadcast live by Channel One, Rossiya-1 and Rossiya-24 TV channels and the Mayak, Vesti FM and Radio Rossii radio stations, President Vladimir Putin was clearly annoyed when someone from the audience raised the question whether the Olympic Park area in Sochi was not in fact turning into a white elephant. The president reminded his listener that he had already elaborated on the subject and again assured that appropriate plans had been made for the sports facilities in the area: 'Some of them will be turned into exhibition centres, shopping malls; some will be used as concert halls; some ice rinks will still be used for their initial purpose', he remarked (Putin 2014b) , even if this answer for an outside observer would seem to have a not altogether convincing touch to it. Different estimates are given concerning the actual number of visitors to Sochi in the period after the Games. Not very surprisingly perhaps, many of the new hotels appear now to stand almost empty most of the time (Saakov 2014) . In a somewhat unexpected turn of the discussion during the aforementioned Direct Line with Putin in April 2014, one listener expressed his fears that the incorporation of Crimea would have negative effects for Sochi since the competition for domestic Russian tourism would increase. Now, he argued, Russians not wishing or not being able to go abroad during their holidays would have one more destination to choose from. However, Putin reassured his audience, Sochi and Crimea were not likely to compete for the same segments of domestic tourism. Many tourists who would not be able to afford the price tags encountered in Sochi would opt for Crimea instead. In other words, Sochi with its top-notch hotels and luxury apartments would not focus on the same clientele as Crimea (Putin 2014b) . Again, however, Putin's insistence would rather seem to underline the risk for emergence of white elephants, especially as Russia at the time of his statement was hard hit economically by the combined effects of rapidly dropping oil prices, weak world economy and the consequences of Western sanctions against Russia in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea. So, who would really afford going to Sochi on holidays?
Endeavoring to host other sport events is otherwise an evident option for how to use newly built arenas and hotels. Already in October 2014 Sochi organized the Russian Formula-1 Grand Prix (Sochi Autodrom 2014), which is planned to be an annually recurring event. In November 2014 the World Chess Championship was arranged in Sochi (Feeney 2014 ) and in December the ice hockey tournament Channel One Cup 2014 was organized there (Petersson, R. 2014) . In 2018 Sochi's Fisht Olympic Stadium will be used as one of the arenas during the FIFA World Cup in football.
For its part the World Chess Championship brought in a somewhat unexpected manner back high politics to Sochi. In a public meeting with Putin, the President of the World Chess Federation, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, heaped scorn on the defending World Champion, the Norwegian chess player Magnus Carlsen for at first, with reference to the political climate not being sufficiently calm, refusing to defend his title in Sochi. Not until Carlsen was threatened with being stripped of his title and having to face a fine of several millions of dollars did he accept Sochi as a venue. Also, Ilyumzhinov went on, all previous world champions of chess, including the oppositional Garry Kasparov, had been invited to attend the opening of the game. Many prominent former champions had accepted, whereas Kasparov in principle had been willing to come but had expressed doubts whether he would actually be permitted to leave again if he were to turn up. According to the website transcripts, this observation drew some laughter, and considering the presence of Vladimir Putin, it is likely that he too joined in the merriment. At least he remarked that Kasparov was very welcome to attend. Even if he had 'not turned out to be the most effective politician so far … he is an outstanding chess player', Putin said (Meeting with heads of international sports organizations, 2014).
Environmental degradation
In economic terms Sochi-2014 was the most expensive Winter Games so far in Olympic history (Müller 2014) . Most often the costs are measured in money alone, however. It is more rarely mentioned that Sochi-2014 is also likely to have been the most costly Games ever in terms of damage done to nature. The most serious environmental issues that occurred in connection with the Olympics during the years 2006-2013 are summarized in Caucasian Knot (2014) and in a report by Gazaryan and Shevchenko (2014) .
А circumstance that stands out in the choice of Sochi as the venue for winter Olympic Games is that it relied on combining winter sports facilities with a subtropical coastal climate and an adjacent alpine zone, which made the construction works both complicated and expensive (Petersson and Vamling 2013) . The Sochi region is also a region that is well-known for its ecological uniqueness, which posed additional challenges for the construction work. North of Sochi is the Sochi National Park, established already in 1983 as оne of the first national parks in the Russian Federation. Further to the northeast is the Western Caucasus Reserve that was inscribed into the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1999 with the justification that "it is of global significance as a centre of plant diversity" and "the only large mountain area in Europe that has not experienced significant human impact, containing extensive tracts of undisturbed mountain forests unique on the European scale" (UNESCO World Heritage List). The Imeretian Lowlands, a coastal area in Adler where the Olympic coastal cluster was built, were well-known wetlands with unique flora and fauna and an important place for migratory birds (Genin 2013) . Thus, notwithstanding the ecological uniqueness and sensitivity of both the mountain and coastal clusters, the authorities decided to build the Olympic infrastructure there, with little concern for environmental values that risked being lost. Notably, the detrimental environmental impact is glossed over in the official reports about infrastructural development in the Sochi region.
One area that has been particularly hard hit by the construction works is the banks of the river Mzymta that flows from Krasnaya Polyana to Adler by the Black Sea. For several years large quantities of gravel for construction works were extracted there (Ria Novosti 2009), resulting in changes in the relief of the riverbed. The Olympic project included the building of both a highway and a railroad, from Adler to Krasnaya Polyana, connecting the coastal and alpine Olympic complexes. In this process relict boxwood forests were cut down to make way for the modern highway. Not only were vast areas of these forests cut down, but remaining parts of the forests were severely damaged and dehydrated (Gazaryan 2010) . It was later agreed that new trees were to be planted to try to make up for this. However, the situation was made even worse by the fact that devastating box tree moths were accidently introduced together with the new plants into the habitat of the Caucasian boxwood tree. Even though the damage was discovered already in 2012, no appropriate measures were undertaken and the insects spread beyond the Sochi area thereby threatening other relict boxwood forests in the Caucasus (Ekologicheskaya vakhta po Severnomu Kavkazu 2014).
The extraction of enormous quantities of sand and gravel have occurred not only in Mzymta but also in other mountain rivers. This has distorted the river banks and changed water levels, resulting in an increased number of mudslides and flooding. Akhshtyr is one example of a village in Sochi were all water disappeared (Kravchenko 2014b) due to the construction works. The disposal of waste from the huge building sites has been another problem. Dumps, some illegal, occurred in different places around the city (Digges 2014) . Moreover, Sochi does not have sufficient capacity to take care of all its sewage, which means that some of the polluted water is flushed directly into the Black Sea (Kravchenko 2014a) . 
The Circassian issue -before Sochi, after Ukraine
For the Circassians and their situation as the marginalized and squeezed out indigenous population of Northwest Caucasus, the mega-event of Sochi also denoted an opportunity to have the world's attention for their plight. However, earlier research has shown that marginalized and socially excluded groups seldom profit from the organization of megaevents on their home ground (Minnaert 2012) . Did this apply also to the Circassians and the Sochi Olympics? Or was there at least one local collective winner due to the organization of the Sochi Winter Games?
The Circassian situation was therefore paradoxical in the sense that whereas this North Caucasian indigenous group fiercely opposed the very organization of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, the Games themselves meant a unique chance for the Circassians to make their voices heard internationally. During the run-up to the Olympics they all of a sudden had a global audience, large segments of which were ready and prepared to listen while they communicated their claims for recognition of their cause. This was quite simply their fifteen minutes of fame, a rare and short-lived period of celebrity and world-wide attention (Petersson & Vamling 2013, 9) .
2014, the year of the Sochi Olympic Games, was also the 150th anniversary of the end of the Already two days before the Games were even closed, political events in Ukraine took over media attention and eclipsed the Circassian issue completely. This was the time of the mass killings at Maidan, the popular outrage against president Yanukovich and his ultimate ouster.
The media in the West and in Russia were from now on only marginally interested in events in the North Caucasus. The Circassian plight was no longer hot news, not even news, to the global audience, and the fifteen minutes of fame were gone.
Even so, in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and the deteriorated relations between Russia and the West, the Circassians have continued to try to achieve that the acts once committed by tsarist Russia be more widely recognized as genocide. Quite clearly, however, the Circassians (Adzhieva 2014 Andzor Kabard, a well-known Circassian activist, also seems to side with this standpoint: "If you take Circassian activists who are citizens of Russia, then the level of support for the appeal to Ukraine is very high. In the diaspora, it's even higher" (Adzhieva 2014, 40-41) .
The Russian authorities have responded to the appeals to Ukraine and Poland with tighter restrictions on the activities of Circassian activists (Dzutsev 2014) . For instance, the editor-inchief of NatPress, Aslan Shazzo, was interrogated at the Center for Fighting Extremism in Adygea for having published articles on the appeals (Natpress 2014c). In late July 2014, Timur Kuashev, an oppositional Circassian author, disappeared and was found dead on the following day (Shevchenko 2014) . Earlier during the year Kuashev had approached the so- 
Conclusion
As this discussion of some of the key problems that were anticipated to hit Sochi in connection with the Winter Olympics has shown, the legacy of the Games is a rather heavy one for the town and for the region. In the two first cases discussed, on the emergence of white elephants and on feared environmental degradation, problems were to a large extent anticipated and the organization of the Games was rightly feared early on by activists. The problems were predicted to occur, and occur they did. They continue to fester even in the absence of international attention, and it is vital not to forget this. The international community has an obligation here, not least in view of future mega-events that are likely to take place in other authoritarian states in the future.
Even if this basic obligation of course remains, the situation of the indigenous Circassians was somewhat different from the concerns about useless infrastructural overspending and environmental decay. For the powers-that-be, the Circassian activism and the international attention it evoked was no doubt one of the politically most vexing problems of the preparation phase, but for the Circassians themselves the occasion meant a rare chance to realize some collective goals and improve on their marginalized position in their homeland in particular and in the Russian Federation in general. The Sochi Games served as a strongly mobilizing factor for Circassians in the diaspora and also in the region itself; had it not been for the Games this mobilization and strengthening of the Circassian movement would not have taken place. The Sochi Olympics, both during the period before and during the Games themselves, brought the Circassians international media attention they would not have been able to obtain otherwise. 
Events in Crimea and

